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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been the traditional rule in the United States that a liquidated
damages clause is unenforceable if it is so unreasonable as to constitute a
penalty.' If the liquidated damages clause represents a reasonable pre-esti-
mate of probable future losses, it will normally be upheld; if it represents an
excessive pre-estimate, it will be invalidated as a penalty.2 Although this rule
seems to have evolved from the law of unconscionability, the unenforceability
of penalty clauses has long since hardened into a separate and distinct rule of
law2 Thus a penalty will not be enforced whether or not unconscionability
can be demonstrated. How this traditional rule works can be seen from the
following illustration:
X, a major East Coast builder, agrees to construct a plant for Y, a large
equipment manufacturer on the West Coast. In the contract, X and Y set
the price of the construction at $35,000,000. Y, however, demands that X
agree to an $8,000,000 "liquidated damages" clause in the event of X's
default. Assume that the amount demanded is not a reasonable pre-esti-
mate of Y's probable future losses and clearly constitutes a penalty. Al-
though fully aware of the penal nature of the clause, X voluntarily agrees
to it because he wants to win the lucrative contract. Before X begins
construction, however, A approaches X and offers X $40,000,000 to build
a similar plant. Since X has limited capacity, he cannot build both plants.
X decides to repudiate his contract with Y and build the plant for A.
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. The author wishes to thank Professor Joseph
M. Perillo of Fordham Law School and Professor Edward Yorio of Cardozo Law School for reading and
commenting on the early drafts of the manuscript. The views presented, however,.are solely those of the author.
1. See, e.g., 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 776, at 667-70 (3d ed. 1961).
2. For the factors that are considered in determining whether a stipulated damages clause is an invalid
penalty or a valid liquidated damages clause, see J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 14-31, at 565-67
(2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as CALAMARI & PERILLO]. The most important consideration, however, is
whether the amount stipulated is a reasonable pre-estimate of probable future losses. Id. at 565. The Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, however, validates a liquidated damages clause if the amount stipulated is reason-
able in the light of either anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 356(1). See also U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1978 version).
3. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 2, § 9-38, at 318-19. Occasionally there are judicial intimations that
substantial stipulated damages amounts should be permitted absent a showing of unconscionability or coercion.
See Gruschus v. C.R. Davis Contracting Co., 75 N.M. 649, 655, 409 P.2d 500, 504 (1965).
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Because of X's breach, Y hires V construction company to build his plant
for $36,000,000 and sues X for the stipulated damages of $8,000,000. X
sets up as a defense the penal nature of the stipulated damages clause.
Under normal circumstances the law will require X to pay Y only
$1,000,000-the difference between the contract price of $35,000,000 and the
cost of Y's substituted performance, $36.000,000.4 The law will not enforce the
penalty even though X voluntarily and willingly agreed to it. In essence, by
breaching, X will achieve a net gain of $4,000,000; he will receive $5,000,000
more from A than from Y and will have to pay Y only $1,000,000 in damages.
Both Holmes' compensation theory of contract law 5 and conventional
economic wisdom 6 support this result. Economists argue that legal rules
should maximize net social gain. By not enforcing the penalty (i.e., by requir-
ing X to compensate Y only for losses caused by the breach), X will be
encouraged to perform the more advantageous contract, thus creating a net
social gain of $4,000,000. This result has been dubbed the theory of "efficient
breach.",7 In recent years, however, two theorists, Goetz and Scott, have
questioned this economic analysis, arguing that in a world where penalty
clauses are enforced, economic efficiency will still be achieved.8 If the en-
forcement of penalty clauses can be shown to be efficient, society would reap
the added dividend that the X's of such a world would be required to live-up to
their bargains. Morality and efficiency would thus be merged.
This Article suggests that perhaps there is no need to posit such a fanciful
world-that world may be with us here and now. Through the use of standby
letters of credit-a much used adjunct of many business transactions-
penalty clauses may be rendered enforceable. 9 In order to develop this analy-
sis, Part II of this Article briefly explains what a standby letter of credit is and,
more importantly, how it functions in the overall business transaction. Part III
analyzes how the standby letter of credit can act to enforce a penalty clause in
an underlying contract and shows that once a bank pays an amount of money
pursuant to standby letter of credit, various factors may combine to block
recovery of the amount paid even though the amount paid constitutes a penal-
ty. Part IV demonstrates that, even if one accepts this conclusion, standby
4. Consequential damages and damages resulting from the delay may also be recovered by Y if and when
they exist. In the subsequent analysis, however, these damages will be disregarded.
5. See, e.g., Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
6. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.9, at 89-90 (2d ed. 1977).
7. Professor Linzer attributes the first use of this term to Professors Goetz and Scott. Linzer, On the
Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. I11,
114 n.13 (1981).
8. Goetz and Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on
an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977). See text accompany-
ing notes 108-11 infra.
9. See Gable, Standby Letters of Credit: Nomenclature Has Confounded Analysis, 12 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L BUS. 903, 942-43 (1980). Gable briefly mentions the fact that, due to political factors in a foreign country,
international standby letters of credit can, as a practical matter, enforce penalty clauses. See note 93 infra.
(Vol. 43:1
1982] STANDBY LETTERS OF CREDIT
letter of credit law still does not preclude the theory of efficient breach from
operating. In other words, properly understood, contracting parties can em-
ploy letter of credit law and penalty clauses to achieve fair and efficient
results.
II THE STANDBY LETTER OF CREDIT
In order to appreciate how a standby letter of credit operates, it is neces-
sary first to understand what a letter of credit is and second to understand the
difference between the two forms of letters of credit-the commercial letter of
credit and the standby letter of credit.
A. Letters of Credit in General
In pertinent part, the Uniform Commercial Code (the Code)'0 defines a
letter of credit as "an engagement by a bank ... made at the request of a
[bank's] customer... that the [bank] will honor drafts or other demands for
payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the credit."" Since
most bank letters of credit are irrevocable, 12 by issuing them in favor of a
named individual the bank undertakes an irrevocable payment obligation with
respect to this individual. The irrevocable nature of the bank's payment com-
mitment is the hallmark of the letter of credit. The significance of this commit-
ment, however, can be understood only in the context of an overall business
transaction.
Obviously a letter of credit is not issued in a vacuum; it is always part of a
larger deal between contracting parties. 3 Three separate contracts are re-
10. Unless otherwise noted, all citations to the Uniform Commercial Code are to the 1978 Official Text.
11. U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(a). The full text of the section reads:
"Credit" or "letter of credit" means an engagement by a bank or other person made at the request of a
customer and of a kind within the scope of this Article (Section 5-102) that the issuer will honor drafts
or other demands for payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the credit.
A letter of credit can thus be issued by banks as well as non-banks. Throughout this Article, however, reference
will be made only to letters of credit issued by banks.
For the scope of Article 5, see U.C.C. § 5-102(1). Article 5, however, may not always apply to the letter of
credit transaction. New York, for example, has added the following subsection to U.C.C. § 5-102:
Unless otherwise agreed, this Article 5 does not apply to a letter of credit or a credit if by its terms or by
agreement, course of dealing or usage of trade such letter of credit or credit is subject in whole or in
part to the Uniform Customs and Practice for Commercial Documentary Credits fixed by the Thir-
teenth or by any subsequent Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce. N.Y. U.C.C.
§ 5-102(4) (McKinney 1964).
Thus, the Uniform Customs and Practice for Commercial Documentary Credits might often govern com-
mercial and standby letters of credit. This Article will cite only to letter of credit law contained in Article 5 of the
Code, not to letter of credit law contained in the Uniform Customs and Practice for Commercial Documentary
Credits. The thesis of this Article, however, would not be changed if the Uniform Customs and Practice
governed the transaction. For a copy of the Uniform Customs and Practice, see INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE, PUBLICATION NO. 290 (1974).
12. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 18-4, at 721 (2d ed. 1980).
13. For brief and lucid discussions of letter of credit law, see id. at Chapter 18; Squillante, Letter of Credit:
A Discourse (pts. I-li), 84 COM. L.J. 372, 426, 474 (1979), (pts. IV-VIII), 85 COM. L..L 48, 89, 145, 177, 220
(1980).
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quired for a letter of credit to issue. 14 Contract I typically involves an underly-
ing agreement between two parties wherein one of the parties undertakes a
payment obligation. For example, seller agrees to ship buyer $200,000 worth
of widgets; buyer, in return for the seller's promise, agrees to pay seller
$200,000 for the widgets. An underlying contract has been entered into, with
buyer undertaking a payment obligation. For reasons to be discussed below,
the seller may prefer the payment obligation to run from a bank rather than
from the buyer. To substitute a bank's obligation for his, the buyer will
approach a bank and contract with it to issue an irrevocable letter of credit for
$200,000 in favor of the seller (Contract II). The buyer, however, will specify
in his contract with the bank that the bank is to pay the letter only if certain
conditions are met. If the bank agrees, it will issue an irrevocable letter in
favor of the seller (Contract III), committing itself to honor seller's drafts for
$200,000, assuming, of course, that the specified conditions are met.'5 Con-
tract III thus substitutes the payment obligation of the bank for that of the
buyer. 1
6
What is important about this arrangement is that each of these three
contracts is separate and involves different parties. Contract I is between
buyer and seller; Contract II is between buyer (dubbed "the customer" by
Article 5 of the Code)17 and the bank (dubbed "the issuer"); 8 and Contract
III is between the bank ("the issuer") and the seller (dubbed "the benefici-
ary"). 9 Not only are these three contracts separate from each other, but they
are also independent of each other. This means, for example, that disputes
with respect to Contract I between buyer and seller cannot affect the issuing
bank's payment obligation towards the seller/beneficiary under Contract 111.20
14. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 995, 12 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 317, 322 (N.D. Ga. 1973), for the model for this analysis. The author, however, has reversed the order of
Contracts I and II in the case. In addition, see Justice, Letters of Credit: Erpectations and Frustrations-Part I,
94 BANKING L.J. 424, 425 (1977).
15. The irrevocable commercial letter of credit may also be "confirmed" by a local bank in seller's area.
Since the issuing bank will usually be in the buyer's locale, the seller may also wish to receive a payment
commitment from a bank in his locale. Hence, a confirmed irrevocable commercial letter of credit has the
payment commitments of two banks behind it. See U.C.C. §§ 5-107(2) and 2-325(3). See also H. HARFIELD,
BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 214 (5th ed. 1974).
16. Some have suggested that it may be a misnomer to call this Contract III a true contract. See, e.g., J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW UNDERTHE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 18-2, at711
(2d ed. 1980).
17. U.C.C. § 5-103(g).
18. U.C.C. § 5-103(c).
19. U.C.C. § 5-103(d).
20. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 5-114, Official Comment I and American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
474 F. Supp. 420, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The only exceptions to this rule exist in U.C.C. § 5-114(2). "Forged or
fraudulent" documents or "fraud in the transaction" (i.e., in Contract I) can affect the issuer's obligation to pay
under Contract III. With respect to "'fraud in the transaction," section 5-114(2) seems to have codified the rule
in Sztejn v. Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941). There is some dispute,
however, whether the fraud referred to in § 5-114(2) refers to fraud in Contract I or fraud in Contract III. See
American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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B. The Commercial Letter of Credit and the Standby Letter of Credit
Letters of credit are commonly classified according to the functions they
serve in the overall business transaction. The oldest form of letter of credit is
the so-called commercial letter of credit-'"a mechanism of payment utilized
in a transaction involving the sale of goods." 2' The commercial letter evolved
to meet the legitimate needs of international commerce. A foreign seller
deciding whether to sell goods to an American buyer will usually prefer pay-
ment before shipment.22 Advance payment reduces most of the seller's trans-
actional risks, such as potential buyer insolvency, payment delays due to
warranty disputes, intervening currency fluctuations, or unexpected occur-
rences such as the imposition of exchange controls or embargoes. But just as
advance payment reduces the foreign seller's risks, it has the opposite
effect of creating risks for the buyer. For example, if the buyer pays in
advance, there is no guarantee that the seller will in fact ship the goods as
promised. The irrevocable commercial letter of credit, however, substantially
reduces the mutual concerns of both buyer and seller.24 By using the letter,
the buyer can guarantee that the seller will not be paid until there is proof that
the goods are en route: a typical commercial letter of credit conditions payment
on the presentation to the bank of a bill of lading evidencing that the goods have
been shipped' On the other hand, the seller can assure himself that potential
warranty disputes involving the goods will not delay payment: the bank's
obligation to pay the seller under Contract III is not affected by disputes
between the buyer and seller relating to Contract I. Similarly, fears of buyer
insolvency are lessened because a bank has now committed itself to pay.
Also, since the seller will be paid soon after shipment of the goods, not upon
their arrival at a foreign destination, the time within which currency fluc-
tuations or unexpected events can occur is reduced.
21. Arnold and Bransilver, The Standby Letter of Credit-The Controversy Continues, 10 U..C. L.J. 272,
277 (1978). Of course, commercial letters of credit can serve a financing function as well as a payment function.
See Harfield, Secondary Uses of Commercial Credits, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 899 (1944).
22. For a more detailed discussion of the risks faced by sellers and buyers in a typical international sale of
goods, see A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE TRADE 2-3 (19M7; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 18-1, at 704-08 (2d ed. 1980).
23. For a discussion of the risks of currency fluctuation with respect to the international sale, see
H. HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 23-24 (5th ed. 1974).
24. The Code's definition of a letter of credit is quite broad. The definition can include such devices as
authorities to purchase drafts and authorities to pay drafts. See U.C.C. §§ 5-102(1), 5-102(2), and 5-103(l)(a).
See also Official Comment I to § 5-103; Harfield, Practice Commentary, N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-102 (McKinney.
1964).
25. As a precondition for paying the draft, an ordinary commercial letter of credit will require the presenta-
tion of an invoice (a representation by seller of the nature of the goods shipped), a bill of lading (a transit receipt
for the goods provided by shipper) and some form of transit risk insurance policy. Sometimes other papers such
as export or import licenses are also required.
For a discussion of the usual documents required as a precondition for paying a commercial letter of credit,
see Articles 14 to 33 of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Commercial Documentary Credits, supra note 11.
1982]
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The standby letter of credit26 functions differently from the commercial
letter of credit. The latter is used in the sale of goods transaction as a payment
device; the former is used in the non-sales transaction as a "guarantee"
against default on contractual obligations.27 Depending on the circumstances,
contractual obligations are either financial or non-financial in nature-that is,
a contracting party will obligate himself either to pay a sum of money or to do
or refrain from doing an act.
When the contracting party has obliged himself to pay money, the stand-
by letter will add the obligation of the bank to the obligation of the party. For
example, a creditor may loan money to a debtor on certain terms. Although
the debtor will promise to repay the loan, the creditor may demand a greater
assurance of repayment. The creditor may request the debtor to have a bank
issue in the creditor's favor an irrevocable standby letter of credit for the
amount of the loan.28 Thus, if the debtor defaults on his payment obligation,
the creditor can turn to the bank's standby or "backup" obligation. Here the
standby letter of credit "guarantees" performance of a financial obligation-
repayment of a loan-and thus functions as a "repayment guarantee." 29
When a contracting party has obliged himself, on the other hand, to
perform an act, the standby letter will add the financial obligation of the bank
to the performance obligation of the party. In other words, if the party fails to
perform, the bank will pay the beneficiary of the letter a stipulated amount of
money to compensate for this failure of performance. For example, in the
ordinary construction contract (forgetting for a moment the added complica-
tion of a penalty clause), Y, who wants a plant built, may desire that X, the
builder, give him some assurance that if there is a default, Y will be able to
recover his damages from X without protracted litigation. To satisfy Y, X will
agree that a certain amount of money be paid in the event of default and then
will contract with a bank to issue in Y's favor a standby letter of credit in
26. A definition of a standby letter of credit has been provided by the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The
Comptroller defines the standby letter as a letter of credit "which represents an obligation to the beneficiary on
the part of the issuer (1) to repay money borrowed by or advanced to or for the account of the account party or
(2) to make payment on account of any evidence of indebtedness undertaken by the account party, or (3) to
make payment on account of any default by the account party in the performance of an obligation." 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.1160(a) (1980). See also 12 C.F.R. §§ 208.8(d) (1) and 337.2(a) (1980). Standby letters of credit are sometimes
called suicide letters of credit, back-up letters of credit, or guarantee letters of credit.
27. A standby letter can sometimes appear in a sale of goods transaction not as a payment device but as a
guarantee that the seller will either ship the goods or perform certain contractual obligations. See, e.g.,
Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 317
(N.D. Ga. 1973).
For a brief review of some of the situations in which the standby letter has been utilized, see Joseph, Letters
of Credit: The Developing Concepts and Financing Functions, 94 BANKING L.J. 816 (1977).
28. See, e.g., New Jersey Bank v. Palladino, 77 N.J. 33, 389 A.2d 454 (1978); Barclays Bank D.C.O. v.
Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1226-27 (5th Cir. 1973). The standby letter in this case was issued by a
non-bank. But see id. at 1226 n.2 (Mercantile National Bank was a confirming bank under the U.C.C.).
29. In the United States, except in very limited circumstances, a bank cannot legally act as a surety or
guarantor. See Gable, Standby Letters of Credit: Nomenclature Has Confounded Analysis, 12 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L BUS. 903, 914-15 (1980); Lord, The No-Guaranty Rule and the Standby Letter of Credit Controversy, 96
BANKING L.J. 46, 47 (1979). There are differences between an impermissible bank guarantee and a permissible
bank standby letter of credit. These differences, however, sometimes seem more formal than real. Id. at 61-62.
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the agreed-upon amount.30 In the event of X's default, Y can present his draft
to the bank along with appropriate documentation attesting to X's default and
recover the stipulated amount of money.3' Thus the bank's financial obliga-
tion to pay damages guarantees the performance obligation of the builder.
Here the standby letter serves as a "performance bond" since it "guaran-
tees" quick payment in the event of default.
III. THE INTERACTION OF THE STANDBY LETI'ER OF
CREDIT AND A PENALTY CLAUSE
In order to focus on how a standby letter of credit may act to enforce a
penalty clause, let us analyze in more detail the construction contract posited
at the beginning of this Article. Assume that in the contract between X and Y,
Y requires X to procure a standby letter of credit issued by an East Coast
bank naming Y as beneficiary. The letter will guarantee Y payment of the
penalty amount of $8,000,000 should X repudiate or default on his promise to
build the plant 32 Here, of course, the standby letter will act as a form of
performance bond. Assume X (the customer) now procures a standby letter
from the issuing bank. The letter, if it is a typical standby letter, will obligate
the issuing bank to honor drafts drawn by Y up to $8,000,000 on Y's presenta-
tion to the bank of a written notice stating that X has defaulted on the
underlying contract. When X repudiates his contract with Y, Y will draw a
draft on the bank for $8,000,000, attaching to it the written notice stating that
X has refused to perform the contract. At this point, subsequent events must
be considered in detail.
May the issuer (the bank) refuse to pay the draft, claiming that since the
amount sought by Y constitutes a penalty, the issuer need not honor Y's
draft? In this situation, letter of credit law requires the issuing bank to honor
its irrevocable commitment to Y regardless of the fact that the $8,000,000
constitutes a penalty.
Section 5-114(1) of the Code states that "an issuer must honor a draft or
demand for payment which complies with the terms of the relevant credit"
regardless of disputes with respect to the underlying contract.3 Thus the
issuing bank must keep its payment obligation to Y (Contract III) separate and
independent from any transactional disputes between its customer and Y
30. For examples of construction contracts in which standby letters were used, see Parsons & Whittemore
Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 972 (2d Cir. 1974);
Comment, Recent Extensions in the Use of Commercial Letters of Credit, 66 YALE L.J. 902, 909 (1957).
31. A standby letter of credit may somtimes be a "clean" letter-that is, a letter the payment of which is
conditioned on presenting a draft but no documents. See the "'clean" letter in Werner Lehara Int'l, Inc. v.
Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 484 F. Supp. 65, 67 n. I (W.D. Mich. 1980). One commentator defines a "clean" letter
as "payable against a draft or other demand that is accompanied by some written representation that the
beneficiary is entitled to payment." H. HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 68 (5th ed. 1974).
32. A standby letter of credit secured a penalty in Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale
de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 972 (2d Cir. 1974). See also H. HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS
AND ACCEPTANCES 68 (5th ed. 1974).
33. U.C.C. § 5-114(1).
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(Contract 1).34 Section 5-114(2), however, recognizes limited exceptions to
this general rule. If a document which is required to be presented as a condi-
tion of payment is either "forged or fraudulent" or there is "fraud in the
transaction," the issuing bank may validly refuse to honor the beneficiary's
drafty. In the ordinary standby letter transaction, Y must present to the
issuing bank a written notice of X's default as a condition of payment. Since X
did, in fact, default on the contract, any notice of default submitted by Y
would not be "fraudulent" and, if signed by Y, would not be "forged." With
respect to the final exception, the presence of a penalty clause in the underlying
contract between X and Y would hardly constitute fraud in that transaction.
Thus the issuing bank's obligation to pay Y the penalty amount seems clear.
If the issuing bank refused to honor its obligation, claiming that the
presence of the penalty excused its duty to honor Y's draft, Y could success-
fully sue the bank and force it to honor its irrevocable commitment. For
example, in New York Life Insurance Co. v. Hartford National Bank & Trust
Co., 36 the issuing bank refused to honor a draft for $180,000, claiming, among
other things, that a liquidated damages clause in the underlying contract was
"illegal" and unenforceable. 37 The Supreme Court of Connecticut rejected
the issuer's refusal to pay the draft, emphasizing in strong terms the indepen-
dence of Contract III (issuer-beneficiary) from Contract I (customer-benefici-
ary):
[T]he question whether this ... liquidated damages clause was a penalty [was a
claim] relating to the mortgage loan commitment contract between [customer and
beneficiary] which, as discussed previously, was entirely separate and independ-
ent from the letter of credit arrangement involving [issuer and beneficiary]. In the
present case, these allegations were not proper defenses to the issuer's obligation
to honor the draft pursuant to the letter of credit.
38
34. See note 20 supra. This central point of letter of credit law has been expressed in a different way in H.
HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 28 (5th ed. 1974):
It is essential at the outset... to recognize the fundamental precept of commercial credit banking,
which is that the banker approaches the mercantile transaction from the outside, remains on the
outside, and is bound and governed only by the contract which he himself makes and not by the
contract which the commercial parties may have made.
35. U.C.C. § 5-114(2).
36. 173 Conn. 492, 378 A.2d 562, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 761 (1977). See also Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Marquette Nat'l Bank, 419 F. Supp. 734 (D. Minn. 1976). Compare Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co. v.
Pacific Nat'l Bank of San Francisco, 493 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1974), in which the court found that what appeared
to be a letter of credit was in fact a guaranty contract. Since a guarantor (the bank) can utilize the defenses
available to the one for whom the guarantee was issued, the bank could claim in defense that the stipulated
damages amount to be paid constituted an unenforceable penalty. The court, however, found the stipulated
penalty amount to be a valid liquidated damages clause. Interestingly, no mention was made of the validity of
banks acting as guarantors. See note 29 supra.
37. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 173 Conn. 492,501,378 A.2d, 562,567, 22
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 761, 768 (1977).
38. Id. at 502, 378 A.2d at 567, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 769 (1977). On this point, see also Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 419 F. Supp. 734 (D. Minn. 1976), and the dictum in KMW Int'l v.,Chase
Manhattan Bank, 606 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1979). In New York Life Insurance, the bank perhaps could have
developed a different argument to support dishonoring the beneficiary's draft. Section 5-103(4) of the Code
states that Article l's principles ofconstruction and interpretation are to be applied to Article5. Section 1-106(l)
denies a party recovery of penal damages except as provided by the Code or by other rule of law. Since Article 5
governs the agreement between issuer and beneficiary (Contract Ill), no penal damages growing out of this
contract can be enforced. In our hypothetical, however, penal damages arise out of Contract I, not out of
Contract 11. Thus the bank could not utilize this argument since the penalty is in Contract I, not in Contract III.
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In defending its refusal to honor the draft, the issuer in New York Life
Insurance characterized the penalty clause as illegal. This is perhaps too
strong a characterization; historically the prohibition against enforcing
penalty clauses evolved from the law of unconscionability, not from the law of
illegality.39 But even if one were to accept arguendo the characterization, the
illegality of the payment in terms of the underlying contract (Contract I)
normally will not constitute a defense for the issuing bank. The issuer can use
the defense of illegality only when the letter of credit contract itself (Contract
III) is "unenforceable as a result of its own illegality, as contrasted with that
of the underlying transaction."4A If one contrasts the facts in New York Life
Insurance with the facts in International Dairy Queen v. Bank of Wadley,4'
this distinction becomes clear. In International Dairy Queen, plaintiff-
beneficiary sued an issuing bank for refusing to honor plaintiff's draft drawn
under the bank's letter of credit. Defending its refusal to honor the draft, the
bank cited to an Alabama statute that limited the amount of money a bank
could lend to a single borrower. By honoring the draft, the issuing bank
claimed it would have exceeded these statutory limitations with respect to its
customer.4 2 The court agreed with the bank and accepted the defense of
illegality, but only because the illegality affected performance of the letter of
credit contract itself. On the other hand, in New York Life Insurance the
obligation for the issuing bank to pay $180,000 was not in itself illegal. The
illegality, if any, existed in the underlying agreement between the customer
and the beneficiary!
3
If the issuing bank must honor the beneficiary's draft for the penalty
amount, can the customer enjoin the bank from paying the draft? The U.C.C.
severely restricts the ability of the customer to enjoin the bank from honoring
its letter of credit commitments. An injunction is permissible only when a
document presented is forged or fraudulent or when there is fraud in the
underlying transaction.44 Fraudulent or forged documents will usually not be
an issue in our hypothetical construction contract. As for fraud in the underly-
ing transaction, since both X and Y were aware of the penal nature of the
liquidated damages clause, X would be hard pressed to make out even a
39. See note 3 supra.
40. Kozolchyk, Letters of Credit, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, Vol. IX,
Commercial Transactions and Institutions § 5-216 (1979).
41. 407 F. Supp. 1270 (M.D. Ala. 1976). Contra First American Nat'l Bank of Iuka v. Alcorn, Inc., 361 So.
2d 481, 488-90 (Miss. 1978).
42. For a criticism of the result in this case, see Justice, Letters of Credit: Expectations and Frustrations-
Part I, 94 BANKING L.J. 424, 433-35 (1977).
43. Although as a conceptual matter the illegality of the underlying contract-no matter how serious-
should not affect the bank's obligation to pay, at some point the underlying illegality will undoubtedly permit an
issuing bank to refuse payment. This is only common sense. Where that point is will undoubtedly depend on the
seriousness of the illegal act secured by the standby letter. See Kozolchyk, Letters of Credit, in INTERNA-
TIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, Vol. IX, Commercial Transactions and Institutions § 5-
215-16, particularly n. 708. Clearly, however, a penalty clause in an underlying contract (even if it were
considered illegal) should not be treated as if it is so harmful as to afford the issuing bank an excuse not to honor
its letter of credit.
44. U.C.C. § 5-114(2). See also note 20 suara.
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colorable claim of fraud. Thus, as in New York Life Insurance, the issuing
bank will be required to honor its $8,000,000 commitment to Y.
Once the issuing bank pays Y, can X refuse to reimburse the bank on the
ground that the bank violated its contract with X by honoring Y's draft for a
penal amount?45 By contracting with the bank for the issuance of an
$8,000,000 standby letter of credit, X agrees to reimburse the bank if the bank
honors drafts which comply with the credit. In this case, the only conditionof
the credit was that Y present a written notice reciting X's default on the
underlying contract. Since such a notice was in fact presented to the bank, the
bank correctly honored Y's draft and is entitled to reimbursement from X.4
Again, even though the amount of the payment constituted a penalty under
Contract I, this fact does not affect the bank's right of reimbursement under
Contract II.
Subsequent analysis must now consider the position of X and Y in the
aftermath of the bank's $8,000,000 payment to Y and its reimbursement by X.
Is there any restitutionary theory by which X can recover from Y the amount
by which the payment of $8,000,000 exceeds reasonable liquidated damages?
Since Y suffered only $1,000,000 in actual damages, let us assume that a
reasonably wise forecast of future damages should have approximated this
figure. Thus to state the question more precisely, after the bank has paid Y
$8,000,000, is there a restitutionary theory by which X can recover from Y
$7,000,000-i.e., the amount by which the bank's payment exceeded reason-
able liquidated damages? The answer to this question requires a detailed
analysis of the legal effect of the bank's payment to Y.
The most common form of penalty litigation arises when the nondefault-
ing party (Y) sues for the enforcement of an executory promise to pay stipu-
lated damages made by the defaulting party (X). As has already been men-
tioned, in this procedural posture, courts will refuse to enforce a stipulated
damages clause if the clause constitutes a penalty. But once stipulated
damages have been paid, the issue of whether the amount paid constitutes a
penalty will be tested in an action brought by the defaulting party (X) against
the innocent party (Y) to recover on a fully performed promise made by the
defaulting party. In essence, once payment has been made pursuant to a
standby letter of credit, the action has been transformed from one aimed at
enforcing an executory penalty clause to one aimed at denying enforcement to
a fully performed forfeiture clause.47 In the past, forfeiture problems have
45. The bank itself would not have a cause of action against Y for a return of the penalty under U.C.C.
§ 5-111(1). It is true that by presenting his draft, the beneficiary Y warrants to the bank that the necessary
conditions of the credit have been complied with. But the only condition of the credit was that Y present to the
bank a valid notice of X's default. The default did occur and Y presented the necessary notice. Hence Y has not
breached his warranty to the bank.
46. Section 5-I 14(3) entitles the issuer to immediate reimbursement from the customer when it duly honors
a draft or demand for payment. See International Dairy Queen v. Bank of Wadley, 407 F. Supp. 1270, 1271
(M.D. Ala. 1976).
47. See Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 517 (1962); C.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 615 (1935). For a definition of a forfeiture provision,
see 5 S. WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 769, at 637-41.
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commonly arisen in sales transactions where the seller and buyer agree in
advance that if the buyer defaults, the innocent seller can keep as liquidated
damages all deposits already paid by the buyer.48 Corbin argues forcefully that
forfeiture cases should be handled in the same way as penalty cases. "A
penalty will not be enforced merely because it is in the form of a deposit."
49
This is the position adopted in Article 2 of the Code (Section 2-718(2)(a)) with
respect to the sale of goods. But when we are outside the scope of Article 2 (as
we would be with respect to the construction contract hypothesized in this
Article),50 Corbin's analysis of forfeiture law is somewhat overstated.
As a plaintiff suing to recover a penal forfeiture already paid, X is in a less
advantageous position than if he were a defendant in a suit brought to enforce
an executory penalty clause.5' Various impediments either individually or in
combination may (a) defeat X's claim outright or (b) at least predispose a
judge to find that X and Y's stipulated damages clause constituted reasonable
liquidated damages rather than a penalty. For the sake of analysis, these
impediments can be divided into three categories-legal impediments, policy
impediments, and practical impediments.
A. Legal Impediments
1. Plaintiff in Default
Since the bank has already paid Y $8,000,000, X will have to sue Y in
restitution to recover the excess payment (that is, the $7,000,000 difference
between the amount paid Y and Y's actual damages). But remember, X was
the one who deliberately defaulted on the contract, and it is now X who comes
to court seeking restitution. Equity may deny relief to a plaintiff who has
defaulted on his promise to perform a contract, particularly where that default
48. See Talbot, Restitution for the Defaulting Buy er, 9 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 445 (1958). In the absence of
statutory provisions supporting recovery by the buyer, the common law generally denied the buyer recovery of
his deposit. Id. at 449-52.
49. 5 A. CORBIN, A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE WORKING RULES OF CONTRACT LAW § 1074,
at 415 (1964).
50. X might possibly argue that his construction contract with Y was a contract within the scope of Article
2 of the Code and therefore sections 2-718(1) and 2-718(2)(a) are applicable to the construction transaction. X
would contend that the construction of the plant involves a sale of services (labor) and a sale of goods (cement,
etc.) and thus the contract should be governed by Article 2 because of its sale of goods aspect. There are at least
two problems with X's argument. First of all, "where the contract is basically one for the rendition of services,
and the materials are only incidental to the main purpose of the agreement, the contract is not one for the sale of
goods under the U.C.C." Gulash v. Stylarama, Inc., 33 Conn. Supp. 108, 111,364 A.2d 1221, 1223, 20 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 603, 605 (C.P. 1975). Construction contracts are generally characterized as services contracts and not
as U.C.C. sales contracts. Id. at 111,364 A.2d at 1223-24, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 605-06. If the contract had
divided the price of construction into the price of labor and the price of materials, X perhaps would have had a
stronger argument that Article 2 governed at least the "goods" part of the contract. Second, even if Article 2
applied to the contract, the prohibition against forfeitures in § 2-718(2)(a) deals with breaching buyers, not
breaching sellers. In our case, X would be the "seller" and it is he who breached. Thus, X could not directly rely
on § 2-718(2)(a). He would have to rely on § 1-106's prohibition against the granting of penal damages "except
as... provided ... by other rule of law." As shall be developed below, other rules of law may in fact prevent
the recovery of a penal forfeiture in a case where the "seller" and "'buyer" create a standby letter of credit.
51. See Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 517 (1962).
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has been deliberate and in bad faith 2 In deciding whether to grant restitution,
the judge will have to weigh two competing considerations: on the one hand,
plaintiff's unclean hands should deny him recovery, but on the other, penal
forfeitures should not be enforced. If he finds the unclean hands doctrine
controlling, the judge may deny X's recovery outright, citing to the plaintiff in
default rule. 3 Even if a judge decides that the rule against penal forfeitures
must prevail, he must still determine whether X and Y's agreement in fact
constitutes a penal forfeiture. The line between high but still reasonable
liquidated damages and a penalty is a question ofjudgment.54 The normal rule
requires that the reasonableness of the agreed-upon damages be measured at
the time of contracting rather than at the time of breach5 5 Knowing that the
plaintiff was the breaching party, a judge might be more prone to find that at-
the time of contracting $8,000,000 was a high but reasonable forecast of
anticipated losses, even though Y's actual losses later turned out to be only
$1,000,000.
2. Prepayment Versus Executory Promise
Professor McCormick argues that a court might be more willing to find a
pre-paid deposit to be a valid liquidated damages clause than an executory
promise to pay the same amount of money! 6 It is easy to act rashly when one
promises in advance to pay a certain amount of money. It is more difficult to
act rashly when one first has to raise and then actually pay out the money. In
such a case, there is time for some sober second thoughts, and consequently
the chance of making a grossly excessive payment is reduced 5 7 While the
standby letter of credit does not involve an actual cash outlay from X to Y, it
does require X to negotiate for the issuance of the letter by a bank. The need
for this separate contract with a third party should serve as a similar brake on
rash or disproportionate action. Thus, in deciding whether the payment was a
reasonable estimate of probable future losses or a penalty, a judge may be
more easily convinced that a payment made pursuant to a negotiated letter of
credit was the product of reasoned, as opposed to rash, action.
3. Estoppel
By initially suggesting the use of a standby letter of credit, X could face
an estoppel argument when he tries to recover $7,000,000 from Y. In the
52. See, e.g., I G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 5. 1, at 572 (1978); Talbot, Restitution for the
Defaulting Buyer, 9 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 445, 447 (1958).
53. On the plaintiff in default rule, see generally I G. PALMER, THE AW OF RESITrUTION ch. 5 (1978).
See also Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 516-17 (1962).
54. See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 102 (1966).
55. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 2, § 14-31, at 566. But see the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1981), which permits the reasonableness of the liquidated damages clause to be measured
either at the time of contracting or at the time of breach. See U.C.C. § 2-718(1).
56. MCCORMICK, supra note 47, at 615.
57. Id.
(Vol. 43:1
STANDBY LETTERS OF CREDIT
typical forfeiture case, Y is the party who will demand the prepayment of
money as security for X's performance of the contract. Assuming equal
bargaining power between X and Y, X may want to win the contract, but he
may not have the cash to make the security payment. X may then suggest the
use of a standby letter of credit as an alternative to the security deposit 58 If Y
agrees to forego the security deposit, accepting the bank's letter instead, X
will be benefited because he will not have to raise and pay the money immedi-
ately. In fact, X will probably not sign a contract if he envisions defaulting on
it, so X will assume that by using a standby letter, he will never have to pay
the money. Since the choice of the standby letter was X's, and since Y relied
on the letter for his security, X will be in a difficult position to object when his
chosen device has been implemented 9 Even if this argument may not be
sufficiently strong to defeat X's claim outright, it will be at least a consideration
militating against his recovery.
4. Lack of a Precise Restitutionary Theory Supporting Recovery
As has already been mentioned, to recover the excess payment made to
Y, X will have to sue Y in restitution*60 The controlling principle of the law of
restitution is unjust enrichment.6' But unjust enrichment is itself not an
"operative rule" but "a principle which underlies many particular rules." 62
These particular restitutionary rules, however, do not support X's recovery
from Y-in fact certain of these rules, by analogy, would deny X any re-
covery.
a. Mistake
Restitution will support the recovery of amounts paid by mistake.63
Mistakes can be of two kinds-of fact or of law.64 As for a mistake of fact,
since both X and Y voluntarily stipulated the amount of the penalty, X could
hardly argue that there was either a mutual or a unilateral mistake of fact with
respect to the amount agreed upon. It would be equally difficult for X to claim
that the payment resulted from a mistake of law. In our hypothetical transac-
tion, the standby letter of credit obligated the bank to pay $8,000,000 on
condition that Y present the bank with his draft and a written notice attesting to
X's default on the contract. Since Y complied with the condition, the bank had
58. In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 173 Conn. 492, 378 A.2d 562, 22 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 761 (1977), the customer, not the beneficiary, seemed to suggest the use of a standby letter of credit
in lieu of a cash deposit.
59. Technically, X's prior conduct in choosing the use of the standby letter and Y's reliance on that prior
conduct would constitute an equitable estoppel. See 30 C.J.S. Equity §§ 107, 108 (1965).
60. At common law, an action to secure restitution, since it was based on quasi-contract, was usually
considered an action at law. Sometimes, however, restitution could be sought in equity. See RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION, Part I, Introductory Note at 4-5 (1937).
61. Id. § I and Comment c (1937).
62. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 2, § 15-2, at 571.
63. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, ch. 2, Introductory Note, at 26 (1937).
64. Id.
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to pay regardless of whether the amount constituted a penalty. Thus the pay-
ment from bank to Y did not result from a mistake of law. But even if it did,
not every payment based on a mistake of law is automatically recoverable.
The Restatement of Restitution states that one "who, induced thereto solely
by a mistake of law, has conferred a benefit upon another to
satisfy ... an honest claim of the other to the performance given, is not
entitled to restitution. '-65 By presenting his draft to the bank for $8,000,000, Y
presumably has made an honest claim for the money. The Restatement
defines an honest claim broadly: "The transferee [here Y] makes an honest
claim if he believes, however unreasonably, that the performance rendered by
the other is due him, or that there is a chance that it is due."66 For the reasons
developed in the prior and subsequent analysis, Y could honestly believe that
there was at least a chance that the $8,000,000 was due him. Hence X could
not utilize mistake as the basis of his restitution action.
b. Fraud or Duress
Payments received through fraud or duress would also support restitu-
tionary recovery by X.67 In the hypothetical presented, however, we have
assumed the absence of these factors. It has been assumed that both X and Y
had other options and chose to contract voluntarily and out of perceived
self-interest. In addition, both X and Y are large businesses and presumably
advised by competent and sophisticated counsel. Thus, with respect to the
stipulated damages clause ($8,000,000), there would be little chance that X
was either coerced or defrauded-the final agreement as to the amount
represented a considered decision by both contracting parties.
c. Illegality
X might argue that a penalty clause in a contract is illegal and thus any
enforcement of such a clause, whether direct or indirect, would be contrary to
public policy. To permit the forfeiture of the full amount paid to Y would be to
enforce indirectly a penalty and thus violate public policy. X's argument,
however, is flawed for two reasons. First, the rule prohibiting the enforcement
of penalty clauses and penal forfeitures evolved from the law of unconscion-
ability, not from the law of illegality. 68 Therefore, to claim that penal forfeitures
are unenforceable because they are illegal may not be totally accurate.
Second, even if one were to accept arguendo X's characterization, X would
still be unable to recover in restitution-at least according to the general rule.
Normally, when one party has already made an illegal payment, the law will
leave both parties in the same position as it finds them.69 This rule, of course,
65. Id. § 45. The exceptions to this rule do not seem applicable to the facts presented in this Article.
66. Id. § 45, comment b.
67. For restitution for fraud, see id. § 28 and comment a; for duress, see id. § 70.
68. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 2, § 9-38, at 318-19.
69. Id. § 22-5, at 785.
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does admit of some exceptions. One common exception permits the return of
the illegal payment if the plaintiff can demonstrate that, as between him and
the defendant, he is not "in pari delicto," that is, he is the less culpable
party.70 This exception, however, could hardly justify returning the
$7,000,000 to X. Assuming Y did not coerce or defraud X, why should X be
considered less culpable in agreeing to the clause than Y?
d. Penalty Theory
Those cases that permit the recovery of penal forfeitures generally do so
on the theory that penal forfeitures are analogous to penalty clauses 7 ' But as
has already been shown, the analogy between executory penalty clauses and
penal forfeitures is not totally persuasive. 72 Plaintiff's unclean hands are rele-
vant in the forfeiture case but not relevant in the penalty case. Since forfeiture
cases do involve this added relevant factor, they hardly seem directly anal-
ogous to penalty cases.
Thus, for X to recover in restitution, he will have to argue that unjust
enrichment is a general principle permitting recovery in all such situations
rather than a set of discrete rules permitting recovery in only some situations.
While this is not an unreasonable position, our legal system has not yet
accepted it.73
B. Policy Impediments
Even when impediments such as the plaintiff in default rule are present,
they should not necessarily be controlling if a strong countervailing policy
exists favoring X's recovery. The stronger the countervailing policy, the more
reason to neutralize competing factors. Subsequent analysis will show, how-
ever, that the policy against penal forfeitures is not as strong as it might first
appear. First, in some areas of the law, there is a respectable body of case law
that has enforced penal forfeitures with little discussion. Second, contract law
may even permit a more generalized enforcement of forfeitures and penalty
clauses if the contracting parties structure their transaction in a certain way.
Third, when a transaction contains a standby letter of credit, the presence of
the letter provides an affirmative justification for enforcing a penal forfeiture.
1. The Policy Against Penal Forfeitures
Is Not Universally Applied
Case law in the United States, almost without exception, denies enforce-
ment to executory penalty clauses.74 But there does not seem to be a similar
70. Id. § 22-12, at 794.
71. See, e.g., Davy v. Crawford, 147 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Oldden v. Tonto Realty Corp., 143 F.2d
916 (2d Cir. 1944).
72. See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra.
73. See note 62 supra.
74. See note I supra.
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general consensus with respect to the enforcement of penal forfeitures. In
certain types of cases, judges have routinely refused to return prepaid
deposits without regard to the amount of these deposits. For example, in
mortgage finance contracts, courts have consistently sustained the validity of
standby deposit provisions even though the amount of the deposit may have
exceeded a reasonable estimate of future losses.75 In land sales contracts,
judges often deny a defaulting vendee the return of his deposit paid to the
innocent vendor of the land,76 although one would have assumed that courts
would permit the vendee to recover his deposit if it exceeded the vendor's
damages. Similarly, in cases involving prepaid bids on public contracts,
courts generally deny the defaulting bidder the return of his bid. 7 There was
even a time, before changes made by Article 2 of the U.C.C.,78 when courts
frequently refused a defaulting buyer the return of his deposit in sales of goods
cases. 79 There is therefore a respectable body of case law that permits the
enforcement of penal forfeitures.
2. The Policy Against Penal Forfeitures May Permit a Dodge-
At Least in Part
The relative importance of any policy, or for that matter the relative
importance of any rule of law, can be tested by the ease with which it can be
successfully avoided. The more significant the policy, the more difficult it
should be to find successful dodges around it. Application of this test suggests
that the policy against enforcing penalties and penal forfeitures may not be as
strong as it initially appears. Although commentators may strongly dispute
this conclusion, the law of alternative promises"' seems to provide an accept-
able dodge around the strictures of penalty and forfeiture law.'
In our hypothetical, X promised to construct a plant and Y promised to
pay X $35,000,000 for the construction. Thus, X's primary promise was con-
ceived to be the building of the plant. In addition, however, X made a second-
ary promise-to pay $8,000,000 as security against defaulting on his primary
promise. Classic contract theory will not enforce a secondary promise to pay
any amount above compensatory damages. Thus the penalty promise is
rendered unenforceable. But might contract law enforce X's promise to pay
75. See Shel-Al Corp. v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 492 F.2d 87, 95 (5th Cir. 1974).
76. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 47, at 615-16.
77. See Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 517 n.76 (1962).
78. U.C.C. §§ 2-718(1), 2-718(2)(a).
79. See I G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 5.11, at 635-36 (1978).
80. For a discussion of the law of alternative promises, see CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 2, § 14-34,
at 568; 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 49, §§ 1079 and 1082; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 47, § 154 at 617-18; 5 S.
WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 781, at 704-09, and § 782, at 714-19.
81. Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 500 (1962), seems to agree
with this conclusion that an alternative promise can sometimes enforce a penalty. Occasionally, cases suggest
that the law of alternative promises does constitute a dodge around penalty law. See, e.g., Paolilli v. Piscitelli, 45
R.I. 354, 358, 121 A. 531,533 (1923). See also Hasbrouck v. Van Winkle, 261 A.D. 679, 682, 27 N.Y.S.2d 72, 76
(3d Dep't 1941), aff'd per curiam, 289 N.Y. 595, 43 N.E.2d 723 (1942), which suggests that alternative contracts
can approach very near to a stipulation for a penalty.
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$8,000,000 if it were structured differently? What if Y promised to pay X
$35,000,000 to build the plant, and X made two primary promises in the alter-
native-i.e., either to build the plant or not to build the plant and pay
$8,000,000? Would the law of alternative promises enforce X's alternative
promise to pay if he chose not to build the plant? Williston would say "no"-
this form of contract cannot be used as "a vehicle for the enforcement of a
penalty."82 Williston would look at the reasonableness of each of the alterna-
tive promises. Unless both of the alternatives-to build or not to build and
pay $8,000,000-could be considered reasonable options for X, the law should
treat the contract as a disguised penalty.83 For Williston, since X could simply
breach his contract with Y and pay Y compensatory damages of $1,000,000, it
would never be reasonable for X to choose to pay the penalty. Hence, a true
case of alternative promises does not exist. McCormick takes the same posi-
tion:
[W]hile an alternative promise to pay money when it presents a conceivable choice
is valid, yet, if a contract is made by which a party engages himself either to do a
certain act or to pay some amount which at the time of the contract no one would
have considered an elible alternative, the alternative promise to pay is unen-
forceable as a penalty.
But despite the conclusions of such eminent authorities, the law of alter-
native promises might in some situations provide a mechanism for enforcing
what otherwise would appear to be a penalty. The law of alternative promises
is posited on whether the parties actually bargained to create reasonable
alternatives.85 The law of penalties is posited on whether there was a reason-
able forecast of Y's future losses.86 The two rules are not the same. It is
possible for X and Y to set the estimate of Y's future losses unreasonably high
(a penalty) but still have the payment of that same amount of money be a
reasonable option for X. Let us suppose that at the time of contracting X is a
well-known builder whose services normally demand a premium. X realizes
that if he defaults, Y can easily obtain a substitute performance from V for
less money than he agreed to pay X. If the stipulated damages clause of
$8,000,000 is tested by whether or not the amount constitutes a reasonable
estimate of Y's future losses, it would be ruled a penalty. But if that same
stipulated damages clause is tested by whether X could have reasonably
agreed to the clause, we may find that X's agreement was quite reasonable. X
may realize that because of his reputation, A may later offer him a substantial
premium for his services. Under the circumstances, it may be reasonable for
X to agree to the $8,000,000 payment. Because X's reputation commands
such a premium, Y might be able to obtain specific performance of their
82. 5 S. WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 782, at 715.
83. Id. § 781, at 708.
84. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 47, § 154, at 618. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 356, comment c.
85. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 2, § 14-34, at 568.
86. Id. § 14-31, at 565.
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contract, thereby preventing X from taking the more lucrative contract.
Recently, courts have been more liberal in granting specific performance in
construction contracts. 87 Consequently, X may be willing to pay $8,000,000 to
forestall possible specific performance and maintain an option to buy his way
out of the contract with Y.88 Viewed in this way, what first appeared a penalty
now appears a reasonable, and in fact a potentially valuable, option for X.
Thus the law of alternative promises permits the reasonability of the
promise to be judged from all surrounding circumstances, not just from the
perspective of Y's future losses. Hence, in many instances, particularly when
there is a possibility of specific performance, it should be easier to defend a
large stipulated payment when it is structured as an option price rather than as
a liquidated damages clause. This is not to say, however, that in all cases a
high option price will be defensible. But at least when it is structured as a
reasonable alternative promise, the court will be able to focus on the full
bargain of the parties (as evidenced by the totality of circumstances surround-
ing the contract) rather than on the reasonability of their estimate of Y's
future losses.89
3. The Policy Supporting Forfeiture Enforcement-The
Presence of a Standby Letter of Credit
When a standby letter of credit is used in a transaction to effect a penal
forfeiture, it usually bespeaks the presence of two things: sophisticated busi-
nessmen and added transaction costs.
a. The Sophisticated Businessman
A rigid rule that refuses to enforce penalties and penal forfeitures may be
justified in consumer transactions where the possibilities of unconscionability
are many and subtle. Such a rule, however, is less justifiable in business
transactions entered into by large corporations advised by sophisticated
corporate counsel. If there is no coercion or unconscionability, why shouldn't
two large corporations be able to include a penalty or a penal forfeiture in
their contract and have the law enforce it? In our hypothetical, X and Y built
the forfeiture around a standby letter of credit. These letters are not customar-
ily used in the ordinary consumer transaction; they are sophisticated devices
used by sophisticated counsel and businessmen to achieve certain results. In
87. See cases collected in Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the
Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 126 n.101 (1981).
88. See Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 283 (1979). Schwartz argues that
a promisor in a unique goods market (arguably X who commands a premium because of his reputation) will
usually have a "strong incentive to preserve his freedom to breach." Id.
89. The Restatement (First) of Contracts gave at least some indirect support to the notion that alternative
promises can constitute dodges around penalty law. The Restatement admitted that alternative promises were
enforceable and that they were easily confused with unenforceable penalties. The confusion mirrored their
similarity. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 344 comment c and § 339 comment f (1932). Corbin also
recognized possible confusion between the two. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 49, § 1082, at 463-64.
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Shel-Al Corp. v. American National Insurance Co.,9 plaintiff sued to recover
an amount paid pursuant to a standby letter of credit, claiming that this
amount plus a separate cash deposit together constituted a penalty. In reject-
ing plaintiff's claim, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that plaintiff had been
advised by counsel9' and that standby deposits were "thoroughly lawful"
methods of doing business in the world of real estate mortgage financing.9 A
per se rule against penal forfeitures would needlessly limit freedom of con-
tract in an area where there is little reason to apply protective policies.
b. Added Transaction Costs
Standby letters of credit increase both the pre-breach and the post-breach
transaction costs of any deal. For example, even when there has been no
breach of the underlying contract by X, the very presence of a standby letter
entails added costs. X and Y must first negotiate the terms of the letter; X
must then negotiate with a bank for the issuance of the letter and pay the bank
its fee. Of course, if X defaults on the underlying contract, the presence of the
standby letter increases post-breach transaction costs as well. Y will demand
payment of the letter; the bank will pay and in turn demand reimbursement
from X. X will have to raise the money or negotiate a loan with the bank. All
these events increase the transaction costs required by the presence of the
standby letter. Thus, when the parties decide to increase these costs to
achieve a particular result (that is, to guarantee payment of a penalty), it
usually indicates that the parties really want the result. Hence, the greater the
costs expended, the clearer the intent of the parties, and the less reason to
vitiate their efforts.
C. Practical Impediments
"Possession is nine points of the law." If the truth of this old adage was
ever in doubt, one only need review recent standby letter of credit litigation.
Once the bank has honored the beneficiary's draft, practical realities often
make it difficult, and sometimes impossible, for the bank's customer to re-
cover any of the money paid. 3 The practical problems differ depending on
whether an international or a domestic standby letter is involved in the trans-
action.
90. 494 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1974).
91. Id. at 89.
92. Id. at 95.
93. Note the complex standby letter of credit litigation arising out of the 1979 revolution in Iran. See, e.g.,
KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 606 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979); American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). More than twenty other organizations sued to enjoin banks from
honoring their payment commitments. See Note, "Fraud in the Transaction": Enjoining Letters of Credit
During the Iranian Revolution, 93 HARV. L. REV. 992,994 (1980). Companies realized that once payments were
made pursuant to the letters, it would be practically impossible to recover the money from Iran. Hence it is
understandable why companies sought to enjoin banks from paying drafts under their letters of credit. See
Gable, Standby Letters of Credit: Nomenclature Has Confounded Analysis, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 903,
939-41 (1980).
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1. International Standby Letters of Credit
The most serious practical difficulties have appeared in international
standby letter of credit cases. In recent years, many international business
deals have employed the standby letter of credit.94 The certainty of payment
that these letters represent makes them particularly attractive to businessmen
dealing at great distances with individuals and corporations of unknown
solvency and business reputation. For the sake of analysis, let us assume that
in our hypothetical, Y, instead of being an American corporation, is an
Iranian corporation. Assume also that construction of the plant was to be in
Teheran. If the contract between X and Y is a typical international construc-
tion agreement, it may contain a forum selection clause (all disputes with
respect to this contract are to be heard in a competent Iranian court) and/or a
choice of law clause (this contract is to be governed by the law of Iran).9 5 If X
defaults on the contract and Y is paid $8,000,000 pursuant to the standby
letter of credit, each of these clauses can present X with a difficult set of
problems in trying to recover from Y.
a. Forum Selection Clause
Once the letter is paid, a forum selection clause forces X to seek recovery
of the excess payment in an Iranian court. The political situation in a partic-
ular foreign country at any given time may make recovery unlikely or virtually
impossible. Even if an American court could be persuaded not to enforce the
forum selection clause,96 any judgment against Y in an American court would
be only symbolic, unless Y had assets either in the United States or in some
94. By 1978, commercial banks in the United States had issued approximately $25 billion worth of standby
letters of credit. Gable, Standby Letter of Credit: Nomenclature Has Confounded Analysis, 12 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L BUS. 903, 913 n.50 (1980). With respect to the government of Iran alone, American contractors were
"'contingently liable for millions of dollars in guarantee letters of credit .... * Note, "'Fraud in the Transac-
tion": Enjoining Letters of Credit During the Iranian Revolution, 93 HARV. L. REV. 992, 992 (1980). See also
Arnold and Bransilver, The Standby Letter of Credit-The Controversy Continues, 10 U.C.C. L.J. 272, 278-79
(1978).
95. The underlying contract (Contract I) in American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F.
Supp. 420, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), contained both of these clauses. A choice of law clause alone was present in the
underlying contract (Contract I) in Dynamics Corp. v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 993,
12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 317, 319 (N.D. Ga. 1973). "Forum selection clauses" in underlying contracts between
American companies and the Government of Iran caused particular problems in arranging for the release of the
American hostages held in Teheran during 1981. If such a clause existed, American companies were precluded
from presenting their claims to the International Arbitral Tribunal organized to settle claims between the United
States and Iran. See Settlement of Claims Agreement, Jan. 19, 1981, Art. 11, 20 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 224,
230-31 (1981). On the entire subject of the Iran-United States Hostage Agreement, see McLaughlin and Teclaff,
The Iranian Hostage Agreements: A Legal Analysis, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 223 (1981).
96. In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), the Supreme Court recognized that a freely
negotiated international forum selection clause requiring suit in a neutral foreign jurisdiction should be enforced
unless one of the parties to the contract could demonstrate that enforcement would be "'unreasonable and
unjust." Id. at 15. A clause selecting Iran as the forum could be distinguished from the facts in The Bremen since
it would not be a neutral forum. Similarly, the American company could show that the political climate in Iran
would make enforcement of the clause "unjust." See American Bell Int'l v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F.
Supp. 420, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gable, Standby Letters of Credit: Nomenclature Has ConfoundedAnalysis, 12
LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 903, 937 n.182 (1980).
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other non-Iranian jurisdiction that would enforce the American judgment? 7
X, of course, may have foreseen these problems at an early stage and tried to
keep some of Y's assets in the United States as security for the payment of
any eventual judgment. Litigants have tried to attach the bank's payment
under the letter of credit as a way of keeping assets of the beneficiary in the
jurisdiction." Such attempts have been universally unsuccessful. 99 Apart
from the constitutional issues involved, ° ° if these attachments were success-
ful, they would undermine the central principle of letter of credit law-
certainty of the issuing bank's payment obligation.0
b. Choice of Law Clause
If the contract between X and Y contained not a forum selection clause
but a choice of law clause, different practical and legal problems would
emerge. The law of many foreign countries may countenance the enforcement
of penalties and penal forfeitures. 1°2 Thus, even if a suit could be instituted in
a particular foreign country, the courts of that country might deny X relief. If
suit were instituted instead in an American tribunal, the American court might
choose to enforce the choice of law clause, thus applying the foreign law.'0 3
Again X would be denied relief. Even if the foreign law stipulated in the
contract would not enforce penalties, exchange controls, expenses of travel to
the forum, and increased counsel and expert witness fees might reduce sub-
stantially the value of X's recovery.
2. Domestic Standby Letters of Credit
Compared to the international letter, the domestic standby letter of credit
presents a different set of practical problems for X. A domestic standby letter
can increase X's litigation costs and postpone the time of X's eventual re-
covery, thus reducing the real dollar value of that recovery. Consider the two
examples that follow.
97. If, as in the case posited, the defendant were a foreign government, a suit in an American court would
raise issues with respect to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976). See Note,
"'Fraud in the Transaction": Enjoining Letters of Credit During the Iranian Revolution, 93 HARV. L. REV. 992,
994 n.10 (1980).
98. See, e.g., Lantz Int'l Corp. v. Industrial Termotecnica Campana, S.p.A., 358 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Pa.
1973).
99. See Justice, Letters of Credit: Expectations and Frustrations-Part 2, 94 BANKING L.J. 493, 495
(1977).
100. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
101. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 18-10, at 752-53 (2d ed. 1980).
102. In civil-law countries, for example, penalty clauses are in principle valid. See Report of the Secretary-
General: liquidated damages and penalty clauses, [1979] 10 Y.B. COMM'N INT'L TRADE LAW 40, U.N. Doe.
AICN.9161 para. 16. In the United States, Louisiana enforces penalty clauses, Pembroke v. Gulf Oil Corp., 454
F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1971).
103. Choice of law clauses that stipulate the application of foreign law are normally enforced by American
courts. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 193-95 (2d Cir. 1955).
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First, X may not be able to acquire personal jurisdiction over Y in his
home state simply because a bank in X's home state issued the standby letter
of credit in Y's favor. The mere issuance of the letter may not be a sufficient
predicate of jurisdiction over Y unless, of course, Y has other forum con-
tacts.' 4 Therefore X may have to sue Y outside his home state, a necessity
that may add substantially to X's travel and litigation costs.
Second, since Y now is in possession of the money, it will be to Y's
advantage to draw out the litigation for as long as possible. Even if Y may
eventually lose, he will only have to return the $7,000,000 with interest at the
judgment rate.'05 In the meantime, Y can invest the $7,000,000 and receive a
higher interest rate than he will have to pay X. Thus Y can increase his
litigation costs and still make a profit while X will not be able to recoup his
added litigation expenses.' 6 Of course, if X can show that Y acted in bad faith
in unnecessarily drawing out the legal process, X may be able to shift some of
his expenses to Y.' 07 But it is unlikely that X will be able to marshall enough
proof to make out a sufficient case of bad faith.
Thus, by transforming an executory penalty clause into a fully executed
penal forfeiture, standby letters of credit may as a practical matter result in the
enforcement of penalties.
The student of letter of credit law, however, may bridle at this conclusion
on theoretical grounds. If the underlying contract (Contract I) cannot affect
the letter of credit contract (Contract III), how can the letter of credit contract
effect so drastic a change in the respective rights of the parties to the underly-
ing contract? There seems to be no policy objection to this one directional
flow, however. The fundamental policy furthered by letters of credit is cer-
tainty of payment. Therefore, disputes relating to Contract I cannot affect the
letter of credit commitment (Contract III) without undermining this policy.
But the reverse is not true. Once the certainty of payment embodied in Con-
tract III is preserved, there is no reason to prevent Contract III from affecting
rights in Contract I.
104. After all, X (the customer) presumably selected the issuing bank. The fact that the issuing bank was in
X's state was for the convenience and accommodation of X. Unless Y directed X to choose a particular issuing
bank in X's state, X's discretionary acts in choosing the issuer should not provide a basis for personal jurisdic-
tion over Y. In Thomas J. Palmer Inc. v. Turkiye is Bankasi, 105 Cal. App. 3d 135, 164 Ca. Rptr. 181 (1980), the
California court found that the beneficiary of a standby letter was not amenable to jurisdiction in California. On
related jurisdictional points see Werner Lehara Int'l, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 484 F. Supp. 65 (W.D.
Mich. 1980); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 500 F. Supp. 320,325-26 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), rev'd, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
105. In New York, for example, the judgment rate of interest was raised from 6% to 9%. N.Y. LAW § 5004
(McKinney 1981). In most situations New York does not permit compounding the judgment interest. D.
SIEGEL, HANDBOOK ON NEW YORK PRACTICE 547 (1978).
106. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Publiker Indus., Inc. 641 F.2d 1361, 1367-68 (2d Cir. 198 1), for a discussion
of the effect of the low judgment interest rate on the appeal process.
107. "In the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys'
fee from the loser." Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,247 (1975). If the prevailing
party, however, can demonstrate that the other side acted in bad faith, the court could require the losing party to
pay the attorneys' fees of the prevailing party. Id. at 258-59.
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Although this conclusion that standby letters of credit can enforce
penalty clauses may be justified on equitable and practical grounds, it remains
to be seen whether this conclusion can be justified on economic grounds.
IV. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE STANDBY LETTER TkANSACTION
Orthodox economic thinking argues that if X can get a better deal from A
than from Y, he should be encouraged to default on his contract with Y and
take the better deal from A2' As long as X compensates Y for the added
expense of any substituted performance, society as a whole will be benefited
by X's breach. Y gets his performance and X gets the added economic benefit
of a more lucrative contract. Limited resources are better allocated by this
arrangement.
The enforcement of penalties appears to contradict this theory of the
so-called efficient breach. Goetz and Scott, however, have questioned these
assumptions and demonstrated that the enforcement of penalties (assuming
no unconscionability or duress) does not violate the theory of efficient
breach.1' 9 To oversimplify their analysis: assume X agreed to build the plant
for Y for $35,000,000 and to pay $8,000,000 as a penalty if he defaulted. A now
offers X $40,000,000 to build a different plant. If the penalty were enforced, X
would not breach his contract with Y because he would lose $8,000,000 and
gain only $5,000,000 from A-a net loss of $3,000,000. But Goetz and Scott
argue that in this situation, X will not default but instead negotiate out from
under the penalty-i.e., X will buy a release from Y by offering to pay Y his
damages ($1,000,000-the cost of a substitute performance from V) and in
addition part of his profit from the contract with A."0 Since X will receive
$5,000,000 more from A than from Y, he can easily pay Y $1,000,000 to buy
the release. Assuming Y acts rationally, Y should accept the offer-he will
have his plant and a $1,000,000 bonus. X will also be better off by $3,000,000.
If Y either refuses to give X a release or demands too high a price for the
release, X can always forego the contract with A and perform for Y. There-
fore, in a legal regime that enforces penalties, the mutual self-interest of X and
Y should always work to prevent the enforcement of penalties. The market
place will lead the contracting parties to strike a mutually advantageous deal.
Would Goetz and Scott's marketplace analysis hold true in our standby
letter of credit transaction? It should, if both X and Y act to maximize their
self-interest. Once X sees a better contract in the offing, he will approach Y to
buy a release, offering Y his damages and a bonus. The critical question is
whether the existence of the independent contracts between X and the bank
and between the bank and Y can somehow work to block the deal. Obviously
an agreement between X and Y to release X on the underlying contract
108. See note 6 supra.
109. See Goetz and Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some
Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977).
110. Id. at 566-68.
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(Contract I) cannot affect the bank's obligation to Y on the letter of credit
(Contract III) and the bank's obligation to X pursuant to their agreement
(Contract II). In fact, in AMF Head Sports Wear, Inc. v. Ray Scott's All-
American Sports Club, Inc.," the court held that even when requested by
both customer and beneficiary, the issuer has no duty to amend a letter of
credit. But assuming that the bank, the customer, and the beneficiary all
agree, nothing in letter of credit law would prevent the standby letter from
being either modified or canceled to permit X to buy a release from Y.11
Section 5-106(2) of the U.C.C. states that "unless otherwise agreed once
an irrevocable credit is established as regards the customer it can be modified
or revoked only with the consent of the customer and once it is established as
regards the beneficiary it can be modified or revoked only with his con-
sent.""13 Since the bank's irrevocable commitment to pay $8,000,000 has been
established as regards beneficiary Y by Y's receipt of the letter, Y can agree
with the bank to revoke the letter of credit and thereby relieve the bank of its
liability to Y under Contract III. The bank's obligation to pay the letter for the
benefit of its customer, X, was established with respect to X by the bank's
sending of the letter to Y. X and the bank, however, can also agree to revoke
the letter, thereby relieving the bank of its contractual and good faith obliga-
tions to X under Contract II. Although X and Y together cannot force the
bank to cancel its obligations to each, the bank should have no reason to
object to the cancellation when both parties request it. The bank will un-
doubtedly wish to please its customer and the cancellation of the letter should
not affect the bank's fee for originally issuing the letter. In fact, under the
circumstances, by agreeing to cancel the letter, the bank may assure itself of
additional business. More than likely a second modified standby letter will be
issued in lieu of the first. Since X has agreed to pay Y $1,000,000 in damages
and $1,000,000 as an added bonus for releasing him from the underlying
contract, Y will wish the bank to issue a new standby letter to guarantee
payment of these amounts. All parties should be content with the new ar-
rangement. Y will be content because he will receive his plant and the
$1,000,000 bonus guaranteed by the modified letter. X will be content because
he will receive $3,000,000 more by performing for A than for Y. The bank will
be content because it will undoubtedly receive an additional fee for the is-
suance of the second modified letter.' 14 Therefore, nothing in standby letter of
111. 448 F. Supp. 222, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 990 (D. Ariz. 1978).
112. See, e.g., It's Devine Indus. Ltd. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 130 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1977).
113. U.C.C. § 5-106(2). The Uniform Customs and Practice for Commercial Documentary Credits, supra
note 11, adopts a similar position. Article 3(c) states that an irrevocable letter of credit "can neither be amended
nor cancelled without agreement of all parties thereto."
114. U.C.C. § 5-105 states that "[n]o consideration is necessary to establish a credit or to enlarge or
otherwise modify its terms. " Although this section does not require consideration, the issuing bank will charge a
fee for the issuance of a standby letter of credit. See Official Comment to U.C.C. § 5-105. If the bank agrees to
modify the letter, the original letter will be recalled and a new, modified letter issued. Undoubtedly, the bank
will negotiate to be paid an extra fee for its administrative expenses.
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credit law prevents Goetz and Scott's marketplace analysis of penalty clauses
from working to permit X to buy a release from Y.
This conclusion (that economic efficiency will not suffer in a legal regime
in which standby letters of credit act to enforce penalties) can be probed more
deeply, however. Goetz and Scott were correct in demonstrating that a rule
that refuses to enforce penalties produces no more social gain than a rule that
enforces penalties. Under the "non-enforcement" rule (let us call it Rule I),
all of the social gain goes to the breaching party X. When A approaches X
with the more lucrative offer, X will accept it, make a profit of $5,000,000 and
pay Y $1,000,000 in damages. X thus keeps the whole profit of $4,000,000.
Under the "enforcement" rule (Rule II), the gain is shared between X and Y.
When A approaches X with the more lucrative offer, X will have to buy a
release from Y, paying Y his damages and a share of his $4,000,000 profit.
Depending on the price agreed to, X will keep perhaps $3,000,000 of the gain
and Y will receive $1,000,000 of the gain. The only difference between Rule I
and Rule II is not in the amount of social gain created, but in how that gain is
divided."5
If one assumes then that both rules produce equal social gain, it does not
follow that both rules are equally "cheap" to operate. To produce $4,000,000
of social gain, each rule requires X and Y to incur different transaction costs.
Since these transaction costs do not create new social gain but simply distri-
bute existing gain, they represent what economists call a "'dead-weight'
efficiency loss. ' ' 116 Again, if both rules produce an equal amount of social
gain, the preferred rule should be the one that results in the fewest transaction
costs.
Under Rule I (the non-enforcement rule), X and Y would first have to
incur the costs necessary to negotiate both the penalty clause and the standby
letter of credit. When X defaults to perform for A, other costs would be
incurred, depending on X and Y's negotiating strategies. X will undoubtedly
offer to pay Y the cost of a substituted performance in order to avoid litiga-
tion. For various reasons, however, Y will probably refuse the offer. First, Y
will realize that he may be able to recover more in damages than the differ-
ence between his substituted performance and the contract price. He may be
able to recover certain consequential damages and damages caused by the
delay in obtaining a substituted performance. Second, Y will realize that,
because X has defaulted, the bank will have to honor its letter of credit and
pay Y his draft. Thus, if there is litigation after the bank pays, Y will be in
possession of the $8,000,000 penalty during the course of the trial. Pending
judgment, he can invest the disputed sum at a high market rate of interest and
profit on the difference between the market rate and the judgment rate. There-
fore, under Rule I, Y has little incentive to agree to a quick out-of-court
115. See Goetz and Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some
Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 567-68 (1977).
116. Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 285 (1979).
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settlement. Hence, Y will undoubtedly present his draft and notice of default to
the bank and await future developments. At this point, of course, the bank
will incur transaction costs in comparing Y's notice of default with the
standby letter. These costs, however, should be minimal. But once the bank
does honor Y's draft, X must immediately reimburse the bank for the
$8,000,000 payment. To make the payment, X will have to either liquidate
assets or procure a secured or unsecured loan from the bank. This could result
in substantial transaction costs for X. After reimbursing the bank, X must
institute suit against Y to recover the penalty. Although the damages rule to be
applied appears clear-X should recover the difference between the
$8,000,000 payment and Y's actual losses-it may still be difficult to calculate
Y's losses. As has been mentioned earlier, Y will claim damages beyond the
cost of substituted performance over contract price. The resolution of Y's
added damage claims will increase transaction costs. Under Rule I, X should
eventually prevail in the litigation, but Y has a definite incentive to prolong it.
Under Rule II, which enforces penalties, X and Y should incur initial
costs comparable to those incurred under Rule I, that is, the costs necessary
to negotiate both the penalty clause and the standby letter of credit. When X
approaches Y for a release, both parties will incur transaction costs negotiat-
ing an acceptable agreement. Unlike damages rules in litigation, there are no
definite rules for the shape of an acceptable agreement, so these negotiations
could be difficult." 7 Y will try to extort a handsome price for the release, and
X will try to buy the release cheaply. But once a release price is agreed upon,
there should only be minimal added transaction costs. For example, the bank
must agree to the release, but there is little reason for the bank to object.
Similarly, the bank must recall its first standby letter and issue a modified
version in its place. The batk will charge an extra fee for the paperwork, but
the administrative burden should be relatively light since all parties agree to
the exchange.
Although a precise measurement of the costs incurred under each Rule is
not possible, Rule II seems to involve fewer substantial transaction costs.
Even though negotiation guidelines are lacking, the release negotiations
should require less in transaction costs than the payment of the standby letter,
the reimbursement of the bank, and the subsequent litigation required to
reverse the penal forfeiture under Rule I. Even if one were to argue that the
transaction costs incurred under both Rules are roughly comparable, Rule II
would still seem preferable because it obliges X to perform in a manner more
consistent with his original promise. Thus Rule II has this "moral advantage"
over Rule I.
117. Clarkson, Miller, and Murio, Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense, 1978 WIS. L.
REV. 351, 361 n.34. But see Comment, Liquidated Damages and Penalties Under the Uniform Commercial
Code'and the Common Law: An Economic Analysis of Contract Damages, 72 NW. U.L. REV. 1055, 1079
(1978).
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article has concluded that the presence of a standby letter of credit
can act to enforce a penalty clause. When one recalls that penalty clauses are
normally not enforced, this conclusion may seem surprising. But upon deeper
analysis, this surprising conclusion emerges as the correct conclusion." 8 The
presence of the standby letter usually bespeaks a transaction involving
sophisticated businessmen. In such a transaction, the risk of unconscionabil-
ity is greatly reduced. When a penalty clause results from fair bargaining
between contracting parties, there is little reason to deny it enforcement. But
a problem still remains. In order to create an enforceable penalty clause,
contracting parties must incur the added transaction costs necessitated by the
standby letter. The law seems to be adjusting to an overbroad and unwise rule
(the general prohibition against enforcing penalties) in a rather hesitant and
incomplete manner. The decision whether or not to enforce a penalty clause
should not be based on the ability of contracting parties to incur these added
costs. If the presence of a standby letter usually signifies a transaction free of
unconscionability, then it is this factor, not the presence of the standby letter,
that should determine whether the penalty clause should be enforced."9
118. Contra Gable, Standby Letters of Credit: Nomenclature Has ConfoundedAnalysis, 12 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L BUS. 903, 942-43 (1980).
119. See Goetz and Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some
Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 594 (1977).
1982]

